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Case No. 20090628-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Sherman Alexander Lynch, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his convictions for murder, a first degree felony, and 
obstruction of justice, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(3) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was Defendant entitled to a specific jury instruction regarding his alibi, 
where the existing jury instructions already set forth both the State's burden of 
proof and Defendant's lack thereof, and where the supreme court has repeatedly 
stated that a claimed alibi does not shift the burdens of proof in any way? 
2. Did the prosecutor improperly suggest that Defendant confessed to the 
crime, where the only thing suggesting that the prosecutor made such a statement is 
a transcription error? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. Defendant did not raise either of his claims below. As 
such, he can prevail only if he shows plain error, exceptional circumstances, or 
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 34. To 
the extent that Defendant has invited any error, however, he is precluded from 
obtaining review for plain error or manifest injustice. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 
16, If 9, 86 P.3d 742; State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, f f 740,132 P.3d 703. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 10,2007, Defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first 
degree felony, and one count of obstruction of justice, a second degree felony. R. 1-
2. Defendant was tried from November 10-14,2008. R. 132,137,168,173-74. A jury 
convicted Defendant on both counts. R. 173-74. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS* 
Defendant's wife is killed in a hit-and-run 
On October 3,2007, Patricia Rothermich was struck from behind while on an 
afternoon walk near her home in Holladay. R. 283:53-68. The impact threw Patricia 
1
 "In reviewing an appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict/' 
State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,11 n.2, 224 P.3d 720. 
2 
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through the air at approximately 24-29 mph. R. 283:109. Patricia slid 43 feet when 
she hit the pavement, ultimately coming to rest in some bushes on the side of the 
road. R. 283: 33,40,109. 
Although no witness saw the collision, two construction workers working on 
a nearby home heard it. R. 283: 27. The noise "startled" them. R. 283: 27. One of 
them later described as the sound of a "large truck hitting a speed bump at a very 
fast pace." R. 283: 27. 
Shortly afterwards, a passing motorist saw Patricia's legs sticking out of the 
bushes and called 911. R. 283:33. Paramedics were dispatched to the scene at 3:18 
p.m. R. 283:37,55. Patricia had "severe" trauma to the back of her head, as well as 
a "severe" injury to her left calf. R. 283: 59. She was having difficulty breathing, 
was in "severe compensated shock," and was "barely sustaining life." R. 283: 59. 
En route to the hospital, her heart failed and she stopped breathing. R. 283: 61, 67. 
Paramedics tried to revive her with CPR, but she was pronounced dead upon 
arrival. R. 283: 67-68. 
The investigation points to a white truck 
Deputy Michael Anderson from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office 
responded to the scene and directed the initial investigation. R. 283: 71-72. Deputy 
3 
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Anderson had advanced training in accident reconstruction, and worked with both 
the "violent crimes unit and the major accident team/' R. 283: 69-70. 
Based on evidence at the scene, Deputy Anderson was able to observe the 
"slide path" that Patricia's body had followed after striking the road. R. 283: 88-89. 
Deputy Anderson concluded that Patricia had been walking against traffic on the 
left side of the road when she was hit from behind. R. 283: 98. Deputy Anderson 
also concluded that the vehicle had not struck her at either a direct angle or from the 
side, but had instead veered across the road at a "slight angle" before hitting her. R. 
283: 99. Deputy Anderson found no pot holes or adverse road conditions that 
would have caused the vehicle to lose control. R. 283:100. 
Based on the height of Patricia's injuries and the nature of the slide pattern, 
Deputy Anderson immediately suspected that the vehicle that had struck Patricia 
had a high front-end, such as a "truck or a van." R. 283: 97. Deputy Anderson also 
noted some white paint from the vehicle that had transferred to the back of 
Patricia's pants during the collision. R. 283: 93. 
Deputy Anderson also found three broken zip ties in the roadway. R. 283:81, 
85. The zip ties had fallen in a "consecutive" order "in line with the collision path," 
thereby suggesting that they had "come off of the vehicle that was involved in this 
collision." R. 283: 82-83. Based on their retained shapes, it was "clear" that they 
4 
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had "been adhered to something" on a 'Vehicle/' R. 283:84,85. Moreover, Deputy 
Anderson noted that one of the zip ties had "what appeared to be white paint 
within the locking zip of the tie itself/' R. 283: 82-83. 
Defendant behaves suspiciously 
While the initial investigation unfolded, Deputy Christopher Schroeder went 
to the home that Patricia shared with Defendant, her husband of eight years. R. 284: 
32-33; Exh. 94 at 11:40. Defendant was not home when Deputy Schroeder arrived, 
but arrived shortly thereafter looking "nervous" and "distraught." R. 284: 33-34. 
Deputy Schroeder then told Defendant about the collision and offered to take him to 
the hospital. R. 284:35,38. 
Defendant was "very emotional," " [a]lmost to the point of hyperventilating." 
R. 284: 39. Even considering the circumstances, Deputy Schroeder thought that 
Defendant's reaction was "unusual." R. 284: 40. Detective Chad Reyes met 
Defendant at the hospital. R. 284: 46. He, too, thought that Defendant was acting 
"odd." R. 284:46. Detective Reyes has been involved in approximately 50 situations 
where family members were informed that loved ones had been killed. R. 284: 46. 
Defendant's reaction was "[different from everyone else that [he had] been around 
in a similar situation." R. 284: 46. In short, he thought that Defendant was acting 
"suspiciously]." R. 284: 47. 
5 
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Don Carter had had been Patricia's neighbor for 32 years. R. 284: 65. He 
received a call shortly after the collision and met Defendant at the hospital. R. 284: 
66. Like Deputies Schroeder and Reyes, Carter thought that Defendant's reaction 
was "peculiar." R. 284: 68. Defendant was "sobbing" and acting in a manner that 
Carter thought was "way over the top." R. 284: 67. Defendant kept saying "What 
am I going to do?," repeating that phrase "over and over and over and over again. 
. . . He must have said it at least 50 times." R. 284: 67. Carter thought, "you know, 
I've seen some grief, but I've never seen such a reaction as this." R. 284: 68. 
Carter was also struck by something Defendant started to say to him right 
after Carter arrived. Defendant had hugged him and then "started to say, 'What 
have 1/ then immediately corrected and said, 'What am I going to do.'" R. 284: 67. 
Although this did not "mean anything" to Carter "at the time," Defendant's sudden 
change of phrase "caught [Carter's] ear." R. 284: 67. 
Given Defendant's emotional state, Carter offered to take Defendant back to 
his home. R. 284:69-71. Kathleen Mathie, another neighbor, came by, and the three 
ordered Chinese food. R. 284: 75-76. During their meal, Defendant opened a 
fortune cookie and told his neighbors that his fortune said that he would be 
"coming into some money" soon. R. 284: 76. Defendant said that he "found that 
quite amusing," and "talked about it a lot" that night. R. 284: 98. Mathie thought 
6 
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this was "kind of inappropriate." R. 284: 98. When someone pointed out that 
Patricia's home was in the name of her adult children, Defendant said "something 
about her retirement" and "maybe something about insurance" as well. R. 284: 76. 
Sometime that night, Defendant told Carter and Mathie that he was going to 
take a walk by the Jordan River alone. R. 284: 71. Based on Defendant's emotional 
state, Carter told him that he would not leave him alone, but would instead follow 
behind Defendant during his walk. R. 284: 71-72. Defendant objected, but after 
Carter insisted, Defendant dropped the plan. R. 284: 71-72. 
Carter then insisted that Defendant spend the night at Carter's home. R. 284: 
72. At approximately 3:30 a.m., Carter woke up and discovered that Defendant and 
his van were gone. R. 284: 73. Concerned that Defendant "shouldn't be alone" in 
his agitated state, Carter called police. R. 284:74. An officer found Defendant back 
at his house at about 8 a.m. the next morning. R. 284:107. During the conversation 
with the officer, Defendant "brought up the fortune cookies" incident from the 
previous night, and he told the officer that his fortune had said that "I'm going to 
come into a large inheritance." R. 284:109. 
Officers learn that Defendant owned the truck that killed Patricia 
During the ensuing days, Defendant appeared on television asking the public 
for assistance in finding the driver who had killed his wife. R. 284:126-27. One of 
7 
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the people who saw Defendant's televised pleas was Defendant's girlfriend, Nancy 
Scott. R. 284:126-27. 
Nancy and Defendant had been dating for the previous six months. R. 284: 
116. Defendant had refused to let Nancy come to his home, instead insisting that 
they meet at Nancy's home. R. 284: 117-18. Defendant had also repeatedly told 
Nancy that he was single. R. 284:120,126-28. On one occasion in late September, 
however, Nancy had seen Defendant walking near his home with Patricia. R. 284: 
120. When Nancy later asked Defendant about it, Defendant told her that Patricia 
was his "landlord." R. 284:120. 
Nancy and Defendant had a date scheduled for October 3,2007, the night that 
Patricia was killed. R. 284:123. Nancy called Defendant at 7:15 p.m. and confirmed 
that he would be coming over. R. 284:124. Defendant did not say that anything 
was wrong during that conversation, but called back 15 minutes later and told her 
that he needed to stay home because his landlord had been killed. R. 284:124-25. In 
contrast to his behavior elsewhere that night, Defendant was not "sobbing" when he 
spoke with Nancy, nor did he seem "overly anxious." R. 284:125. 
The next day, Nancy saw Defendant on television speaking about his wife. R. 
284: 127. This was "devastating" to Nancy, because she had not known that 
Defendant was married. R. 284:128. But when Nancy spoke with Defendant later 
8 
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that day, he denied that Patricia was his wife, explaining that his public statements 
to the contrary were part of an effort to posthumously protect the public image of 
his live-in landlord. R. 284:128. 
A few days later, Nancy heard news reports that officers were looking for a 
white truck in connection with the collision. R. 284:129. Nancy remembered that 
she had helped Defendant buy a used white truck from an auction house in Murray 
at the end of August, so Nancy called police. R. 284: 129-30. After telling them 
about her relationship with Defendant and his recent truck purchase, Nancy took 
officers to the auction house, where officers confirmed that Defendant had 
purchased a white truck. R. 284: 211. 
Nancy then took officers to a storage garage in Holladay where Defendant 
had kept the truck. R. 283: 114; 284: 130,133,137. The truck was not there, but 
officers found scraps of carpet on the ground with white spray paint on them. R. 
283: 115; 284: 218-19. Allan Ostler, the owner of the garage, later confirmed that 
Defendant had rented the garage from him for the previous two years. R. 284: 213. 
Ostler also confirmed that Defendant had kept a white truck there during 
September, that Defendant had painted some rust spots on the truck with white 
spray paint, and that the truck's hood did not close properly. R. 284: 213. Finally, 
9 
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Ostler told officers that he had asked Defendant to remove the truck from his garage 
during the last week of September. R. 284: 214. 
A few days later, officers received a phone call from a man who was renting 4 
an abandoned home nearby for storage. R. 283: 145-47. The home's garage had 
been boarded up to prevent vandalism. R. 283:146. In late September, however, the 
boards had been unsecured from the garage and someone had placed a white truck 
inside. R. 283: 147. Officers subsequently heard from two neighbors of the 
I 
abandoned home who reported that during the last week of September, a truck had 
been briefly parked outside the garage, covered with a tarp and secured with stakes. 
R. 284:155,165-66. 4 
When officers arrived at the abandoned garage, they found the white truck. 
R. 283: 116. The truck's VIN number matched that of the truck Defendant had | 
bought from the auction house in August. R. 283:130. Inside, officers found an 
auction sticker with Defendant's name on it, dated August 25,2007. R. 283:116,120; 
R. 285: 71. Officers later found the truck's title and registration hidden in a hollow 
space behind the license plate of the van that Defendant regularly drove. R. 285:53, 
4 
56. 
Significantly, officers found evidence linking Defendant's truck to Patricia's 
death in four respects. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
First, when Deputy Anderson examined the exterior of the truck, he found 
"exactly the kind of damage" he had "expect[ed] to see" from the collision that 
killed Patricia. R. 283: 125. A tow hook on the front of the truck lined up with 
where her left calf had been split open, a splash guard lined up with injuries she 
sustained to her right calf, and a "deformation" on the hood matched where 
Patricia's head would have struck. R. 283:136. 
Second, the hood of Defendant's truck did not close properly, and officers 
found a zip tie fragment in the engine compartment—suggesting that zip ties had 
been used to secure the hood. R. 283: 137, 139. A forensic lab compared that 
fragment to one of the broken zip ties that had been found on the road near 
Patricia's body. R. 285: 32-33. The fragment found in Defendant's truck had 
"random fracture lines" that "matchfed] up perfectly" with the fracture lines in the 
zip tie found in the road. R. 285: 35. 
Third, officers discovered that in addition to the white base coat that was 
painted at the factory, portions of Defendant's truck had been touched up with 
white spray paint. R. 284: 181,199. A forensic analyst compared the paint from 
Defendant's truck to the white paint that transferred to Patricia's clothing during the 
collision. R. 284:199. The analyst concluded that the smears on Patricia's pants had 
come from the "same distinct type" of spray paint as that used on Defendant's 
11 
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truck. R. 284:199. The analyst also concluded that some paint "fragments" also 
found on Patricia's clothing matched the factory paint from Defendant's truck. R. 
284:202. 
Finally, officers had the original owner of Defendant's truck examine it. The 
original owner noted several rust spots that had been covered with white paint since 
he had owned the truck. R. 285: 76-77. He also noted damage to the truck that had 
not been there previously, including a missing antenna, a crack in the windshield, 
and the damage to the front of the hood. R. 285: 76-77. Finally, he noted that 
although the hood of the truck had not latched properly, he had never used zip ties 
to secure it. R. 285: 76-77. 
Defendant is arrested for Patricia's murder after giving 
evasive answers to police 
On October 8,2007, Detective Adamson interviewed Defendant. R. 285:107.2 
At the time of the interview, Defendant was unaware that officers had located his 
truck in the abandoned garage. Exh. 94 at 40:30-41:40, 51:30. 
Detective Adamson first discussed the circumstances surrounding Patricia's 
death. When Detective Anderson asked Defendant whether he had any life 
2
 A video of this interview was introduced as Exhibit 94 below and is 
contained in the record. That video contains a timer superimposed on the screen. 
The State will cite to it as Exh. 94 at (time). 
12 
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insurance on Patricia, Defendant said that he had a policy on her through a credit 
union that would pay him approximately $125,000. Exh. 94 at 24:10-26:38. 
Defendant also said that he thought she might be covered under his work policy as 
well. Exh. 94 at 25:25-25:35. 
Detective Adamson asked Defendant if he knew Nancy Scott. Exh. 94 at 
46:16. Defendant responded that she was a "friend from church, a nurse." Exh. 94 
at 46:20. When pressed, Defendant admitted that he had been having an affair with 
her for several months, and that his wife did not know about the affair. Exh. 94 at 
46:40 to 48:32. 
Detective Adamson asked Defendant whether he owned any vehicles. 
Defendant said that he owned a van, and specifically denied owning "any other 
vehicles." Exh. 94 at 15:02-15:06. Defendant also denied making any "recent 
purchases or sales of vehicles or anything like that." Exh. 94 at 20:50-21:00. 
Detective Adamson told Defendant that officers knew that he had rented 
space in Ostler's garage, but Defendant denied keeping any vehicles there. Exh. 94 
at 31:36-31:48. When Detective Adamson asked Defendant whether he had kept a 
truck there, Defendant shifted stories and acknowledged that he had, but claimed 
that that had been "awhile back." Exh. 94 at 31:55. Pressed for details, Defendant 
13 
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said that he had bought a "cheap pickup" for his teenage son, explaining "that if 
you hit something with a truck you won't get hurt." Exh. 94 at 35:00-38:52. 
When asked where the truck was, Defendant said that he no longer owned it. 
He claimed that it had broken down at 4500 South on the freeway two to four weeks 
earlier, and that when a man named "Chuck" had stopped to help, Defendant 
decided to just give the truck to him. Exh. 94: at 35:50-37:40. Defendant said that he 
did not have any contact information for "Chuck." Exh. 94: at 41:21. 
At the close of the interview, Detective Adamson informed Defendant that 
officers already had his truck in their possession. Exh. 94 at 51:25. Defendant was 
then arrested for Patricia's murder. Exh. 94 at 51:40. 
During a subsequent search of Defendant's house, officers found a pair of 
khaki pants in Defendant's hamper with white paint on them. R. 284: 53-54, 229; 
285: 135. Officers also found a tarp and stakes matching those described by the 
neighbors of the abandoned garage, as well as five white spray paint cans. R. 285: 
59,62,65,131,135. As noted, testing showed that this spray paint matched the paint 
found on the back of Patricia's pants. 
On October 10,2007, Defendant was charged with one count of murder and 
one count of obstruction of justice. R. 1-2. 
14 
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Defendant presents alibi evidence at trial 
At trial, Defendant first claimed that other trucks in the area could have 
struck Patricia. One witness reported seeing a white truck in the area between 3:20-
3:25 p.m. with two Hispanic males inside. R. 284: 18, 25-26; 285: 114. Other 
witnesses reported seeing a red truck in the area as well. R. 283:49-51; 284:10,12; 
285:115. 
The State responded by showing that when officers had investigated those 
leads, they had not panned out. Deputy Anderson testified that officers had been 
unable to find another white truck with damage matching this collision, let alone 
one with zip ties attached to the front that matched those found at the collision site. 
R. 284: 23. Deputy Anderson also noted that the reports of a red truck were 
inconsistent with the evidence showing that Patricia had been struck by a white 
vehicle. R. 284:10-11; 285:129-30. 
Defendant also claimed that he had an alibi for the time of the collision. R. 
283: 24; 284:18. Defendant had told officers that he had gone walking with Patricia 
that afternoon, but had left her to go shopping at the Costco in Murray. R. 284: 36, 
48; Exh. 94 at 7:30 to 8:10. Officers obtained surveillance video confirming that 
Defendant had gone to the Murray Costco that afternoon. R. 284: 20-21. Receipts 
15 
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and surveillance video showed that Defendant had purchased gasoline at 3:44 p.m., 
and milk at 3:55 p.m. R. 284:110. 
In response, the State never argued that Defendant had not made this trip. 
Instead, the State showed that this trip was not inconsistent with Defendant having 
driven the truck that killed Patricia. While investigating the crime, Detective 
Adamson repeatedly timed himself driving from the scene of the collision to the 
abandoned garage where the truck had been found, and then from there to the 
Costco in Murray. R. 285:83. Detective Adamson drove this route at different times 
of day, including the time of day at issue here, and he never went above the speed 
limit. R. 285:102-03. On average, the trip took 14 minutes, and it never took as long 
as 20 minutes. R. 285:83,102-03. As noted, 911 dispatched paramedics at 3:18 that 
afternoon, and Defendant purchased gas at 3:44 p.m. — a time gap of 26 minutes. R. 
283: 55; 284:109. Detective Adamson therefore testified that Defendant could have 
"easily" driven from the collision site to the abandoned garage, and then to Costco 
in time to "pump fuel" by 3:44 p.m. R. 285: 84. 
Moreover, officers also ascertained that Defendant's truck had been driven 
only 18 miles since its original owner had traded it in. R. 285: 76-77,125. Detective 
Adamson then drove the route that Defendant would have taken if he had used this 
truck in the attack. R. 285: 78. Adamson drove from the auction house to Ostler's 
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garage, from there to the abandoned garage, then to the collision scene and back to 
the abandoned garage. R. 285: 77-78. The total mileage was 12.2 miles. R. 285: 79. 
In addition, officers were unable to corroborate Defendant's claim that he had 
given his white truck to a man named Chuck at 4500 South. R. 285:110. Specifically, 
officers "found no evidence of Chuck." R. 285:110. But more importantly, officers 
realized that even if Defendant had driven the truck to 4500 South as he claimed, 
and "Chuck" had then driven the truck straight back to the abandoned garage, the 
accumulated mileage "would have exceeded the 18 miles that ha[d] been logged" on 
the truck since it was sold to the auction house. R. 285:110. 
The jury instructions repeatedly set forth the burdens of proof 
At trial, the jury was repeatedly instructed that the State bore the burden of 
proof. For example, the preliminary instructions included the following: 
• Instruction 4 instructed the jury that Defendant was presumed innocent. R. 
177. 
• Instruction 13 instructed the jury that "[t]he prosecution has the burden of 
proof. It's the one making the accusations in this case. The defendant isn't 
required to prove innocence — you must start by assuming it." R. 179. 
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• Instruction 14 instructed the jury that before it could "give up your 
assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be convinced that the 
defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt/' R. 179. 
• Instruction 15 instructed the jury that the "prosecution has the burden of 
proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," and that if a juror 
thought that "there's a real possibility that he's not guilty, you must give him 
the benefit of the doubt and find he's not guilty." R. 179. 
The closing jury instructions were similarly clear about the State's burden of 
proof: 
• Instruction 14 instructed that "all presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 182. This instruction 
further instructed that "the burden is always on the prosecution to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant 
for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or 
duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence." R. 182. 
• Instruction 15 instructed that Defendant could be convicted only if the jury 
was "firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged." R. 
182-83. 
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• Instruction 21 instructed that the jury could convict only if the prosecution 
had proven Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 184. 
• Instruction 34 instructed that Defendant could be found guilty of murder 
only if the State proven that "the defendant, Sherman A. Lynch," had "caused 
the death of Patricia Rothermich." R. 187. 
• Instruction 40 similarly instructed that Defendant could be found guilty of 
obstructing justice only if it concluded that "the defendant, Sherman A. 
Lynch," had obstructed justice. R. 193. 
Defense counsel discussed these instructions with the court before closing 
arguments. During that discussion, defense counsel affirmatively stated that he did 
not "take exception to any of the instructions," and that there were "no instructions 
that [he] had asked for that have not been given." R. 285:142. 
Following deliberations, Defendant was convicted on both counts. R. 173-74. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant first claims that the trial court committed plain error or 
manifest injustice when it failed to sua sponte issue a jury instruction on his alibi 
defense. But Defendant invited any error when his counsel affirmatively stated that 
the court had issued every instruction that he had requested and that he had no 
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objections to those given. Defendant is therefore not entitled to plain error review of 
the trial court's failure to give an alibi instruction. 
Defendant alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 
requesting an alibi instruction. Defendant specifically argues that he was entitled to 
an alibi instruction because alibi is an affirmative defense. Contrary to Defendant's 
claim, however, alibi is not an affirmative defense. Instead, it is simply a claim that 
the prosecution has not proven its case. Defendant therefore was not entitled to an 
alibi instruction, and his counsel did not perform deficiently by not asking for one. 
But even if defense counsel did perform deficiently by not requesting the 
instruction, Defendant was not prejudiced. The jury in this case was repeatedly 
instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of proof, as well as that Defendant 
bore no burden of proof of his own. Thus, the instruction Defendant now proposes 
would have simply repeated instructions that the jury had already received. 
Point II: Defendant next claims that the prosecutor falsely claimed that he 
had confessed to the crime during her closing argument. But while the transcript 
currently suggests that the prosecutor did make such a statement, Defendant 
admits in his brief that this transcript is flawed. And when viewed in context, it 
appears that the prosecutor's statement was actually an argument about the 
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inferences that could be drawn from the evidence, not an attempt to falsely attribute 
a confession to Defendant. 
Defendant's argument is thus based on a statement that the prosecutor never 
made, and his plain error and ineffective assistance claims to the contrary should 
therefore be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A REDUNDANT JURY 
INSTRUCTION ON HIS CLAIMED ALIBI 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the 
jury about his "affirmative defense" of alibi. Aplt. Br. 19-28. Defendant 
acknowledges that he did not raise this claim below, but nevertheless asks this 
Court to review it for plain error, manifest injustice, or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Aplt. Br. 28-42. 
But Defendant invited any error by affirmatively approving the jury 
instructions before they were submitted to the jury. As a result, he can obtain 
review only for ineffective assistance of counsel. When analyzed in that context, 
Defendant's claim fails. 
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A. Defendant invited any error by affirmatively approving the jury 
instructions. 
Under the invited error doctrine, "a party on appeal cannot take advantage of 
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error/' State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, % 26, 153 P.3d 804 (quotations and 
citation omitted). This occurs when there are "[affirmative representations that a 
party has no objection to the proceedings... because such representations reassure 
the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the 
issues." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, % 16,128 P.3d 1171. In the context of jury 
instructions, invited error occurs when a defendant "affirmatively approve[s] of the 
jury instructions at trial." Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 26 (alteration in original). 
Thus, where counsel "confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection to 
the instructions given by the trial court," or even "fail[s] to object to an instruction 
when specifically queried by the court," the invited error doctrine applies. State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 10, 86 P.3d 742. 
A party who invites error is precluded from subsequently obtaining appellate 
review for plain error or manifest injustice. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9; Alfatlawi, 
2006 UT xApp 511, f 26. Defendant invited any error in the instructions here. 
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The court discussed the jury instructions with defense counsel before closing 
arguments, during which the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Same question for the defendant or defense counsel, do 
you take exception to any of the instructions? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, your honor. 
THE COURT: Will you acknowledge there are no instructions that you 
have asked for that have not been given? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, your honor. 
R. 285:142. 
Thus, defendant "affirmatively approved of the jury instructions at trial," 
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f^ 26 (alteration in original), by "confirm[ing] on the 
record that the defense had no objection to the instructions given by the trial court/7 
and "fail[ing] to object... when specifically queried by the court." Geukgeuzian, 2004 
UT 16, \ 10. The invited error doctrine therefore applies, and Defendant cannot 
obtain relief for plain error or manifest injustice. 
B. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, Defendant "must show: (1) that 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability 
exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citing 
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either prong 
will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,1 38, 55 P.3d 1131. 
Here, Defendant claims his alibi defense was an affirmative defense, and that 
because it was an affirmative defense, he was entitled to a jury instruction on it. 
Aplt. Br. 19-27. Defendant then argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 
requesting that instruction. Aplt. Br. 37-42. Defendant is incorrect under both 
prongs of the ineffective assistance analysis. 
1. There was no deficient performance. 
When assessing deficient performance, "a defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her 
trial counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82, f^ 20, 
157 P.3d 371 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993)). "When 
pursuing this analysis, we again indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
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As noted, Defendant argues that his counsel performed deficiently by failing 
to request an instruction on his alibi defense. Aplt. Br. 37-42. But Defendant's claim 
ultimately fails because alibi is not an affirmative defense under Utah law. 
An affirmative defense is an "assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, 
will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecution's claim, even if all the allegations in the 
complaint are true!' Black's Law Dictionary, Defense (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
For example, even if the prosecution proves that a defendant intentionally killed 
another person, the defendant can still be acquitted by proving that he was acting in 
self-defense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (West 2010). Or even if the prosecution 
proves that a defendant bought illegal drugs, the defendant can still be acquitted if 
he proves that he was entrapped, or that he was acting under compulsion. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (West 2010); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (West 2010). 
When raising an affirmative defense, a defendant therefore does not claim 
that he did not do what the prosecution says he did; rather, he simply claims that in 
these particular circumstances, his conduct was not actually criminal. 
Prior to 1973, Utah's criminal law — including the law of affirmative 
defenses —was developed through the common law. State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 
632-33. (Utah 1986). "In an effort to rationalize, clarify, and improve upon the 
frequently archaic common law definitions of crimes, the legislature in 1973 
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repealed wholesale all the prior substantive criminal statutes (including, 
necessarily, defenses) and enacted a sweeping new penal code that departed 
sharply from the old common law concepts/7 Id. "As if to emphasize its departure 
from the old law, the 1973 Code specifically stated that the 'common law of crimes 
is abolished/" Id. (citation omitted). 
Under the current model, "all criminal defenses" must therefore "'be 
grounded in the specific code sections' under which the defendant is charged," 
State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, If 16,193 P.3d 92, and Utah's courts are "bound by the 
legislature's decision to categorize" and define affirmative defenses. State v. Low, 
2008 UT 58, Tj 24,192 P.3d 867. Thus, "Utah's criminal law is statutory." Miller, 
2008 UT 61,116. 
Significantly, there is no statutory provision defining alibi as an affirmative 
defense, nor was there when this case was tried in November 2008. Cf. State v. 
Marble, 2007 UT App 82, f 20 (stating that an ineffective assistance claim must be 
that "on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's 
performance was deficient"). Thus, contrary to Defendant's claim, alibi was not an 
affirmative defense and he was not entitled to a jury instruction on it. 
Defendant responds on two levels in his brief. After citing to a number of 
cases discussing the concept of affirmative defenses in general, Defendant points to 
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two early Utah Supreme Court decisions that analyzed the question and found that 
alibi is an affirmative defense. Aplt. Br. 19-27 (citing State v. Waid, 67 P.2d 647,651 
(Utah 1937), and State v. Saunders, 22 P.2d 1043,1045-46 (Utah 1933)). 
But Waid and Saunders were issued decades before the criminal law 
codification of 1973. Tuttle, 730 P.2d at 632-33. That codification "abolished" the 
"the 'common law of crimes'... including, necessarily, defenses." Id. Thus, Waid 
and Saunders are no longer controlling. 
In addition to Waid and Saunders, Defendant also cites to a number of other 
decisions that have admittedly referred to alibi as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, f 28,192 P.3d 867 (parenthetically referring to "affirmative 
defenses such as a valid alibi or legitimate self-defense"); Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214-15 
(stating, without any alibi-specific analysis, that the prosecution has the burden of 
proof "with respect to such defenses as lack of mental capacity and alibi"); State v. 
Wilson, 565 P.2d 66,67-68 (Utah 1977) (stating that alibi "stands on the same footing 
as other so-called defenses" such as "entrapment, self-defense, lack of mental 
capacity, or of criminal intent"). 
Like Waid and Saunders, however, those decisions are incorrect as a result of 
the 1973 criminal law codification. In addition, those decisions are also at odds with 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
three other decisions from the Utah Supreme Court—all of which were issued after 
Waid and Saunders - that have reached a contrary conclusion regarding alibi. 
The first is State v. Whitely, 110 P.2d 337,337-38 (Utah 1941). Like Defendant 
here, Whitely claimed that he was somewhere else when the crime at issue occurred. 
Id. But the trial court held that in order to rely on this defense, Whitely had the 
burden of proving his whereabouts. Id. The supreme court reversed on appeal, 
holding that Whitely bore no such burden. Id. 
In so doing, the supreme court expressly concluded that alibi is not a separate, 
affirmative defense that carries its own burden of proof. Instead, the court 
characterized alibi as nothing more than a refutation of the State's case-in-chief. 
Thus, "in all cases where the presence of the accused is necessary to render him 
responsible" for a crime, the State "must prove that he was there as part of its case." 
Id. If the defendant claims that he was not there when the crime was committed, his 
"so-called 'defense of alibi' is a defense only in the sense that any contradiction of facts 
which the government must prove to establish guilt may be called a 'defense/" Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216,219 (Utah 1976), the supreme court analyzed 
another case in which the defendant claimed that he was somewhere else at the time 
of the crime. When considering Romero's alibi, the court concluded that his defense 
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had done nothing more than call into question the State's underlying factual 
allegation: "As to defendant's alibi that he was at the zoo and the park on the day in 
question, such alibi is not an affirmative defense but merely a denial that he was where 
he was said to be at the time the crime was committed." Id. (emphasis added). 
Finally, the supreme court re-emphasized that alibi is not an affirmative 
defense in State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987). There, the court noted that 
"an alibi defense . . . is not one that has merit independent of whether the State 
can prove the statutory elements of the crime; rather an alibi defense challenges 
the State's ability to prove the statutory elements." Id. at 1213. Thus, "the mere 
assertion of an alibi defense does not impose on the prosecution" an "additional 
burden." Id. Instead, the "burden on the prosecution remains the same, i.e., to 
establish all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
Here, Defendant never claimed that his conduct was justified "even if all the 
allegations in the complaint [were] true." Black's Law Dictionary, Defense. For 
example, he never argued that he was somehow justified in killing Patricia with his 
truck. Rather, he claimed that he did not kill her, that he was actually "at Costco on 
the afternoon of October 3." Aplt. Br. 24. Thus, his "alibi [was] not an affirmative 
defense but merely a denial that he was where he was said to be at the time the 
crime was committed." Romero, 554 P.2d at 219. And as a result, his "alibi defense" 
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had no "merit independent of whether the State [could] prove the statutory 
elements of the crime; rather [his] alibi defense" only challenged "the State's ability 
to prove the statutory elements." Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1213. 
Defendant's Costco defense was therefore not an affirmative defense, and he 
was not entitled to a jury instruction on it. As a result, his counsel did not perform 
deficiently by failing to request a specific jury instruction on it. 
2. In any event, there was no prejudice. 
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his 
counsel's alleged failure. To prove prejudice, he must show that there is "a 
reasonable probability" that he would have "obtained a more favorable outcome at 
trial" if the instruction been given. Clark, 2004 UT 25, % 6 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Here, even if Defendant has shown that he was entitled to a jury 
instruction on alibi, his claim still fails because he has not shown prejudice. 
According to Defendant, the jury was misled with respect to the burden of 
proof. Aplt. Br. 19-28. Defendant claims that the jury needed an alibi instruction 
that he "had no particular burden of proof" with respect to his alibi, and that he was 
instead "entitled to an acquittal if there was any basis in the evidence from either 
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Br. 26. 
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Although the jury was not given a specific alibi instruction, the jury was 
correctly and repeatedly instructed regarding the applicable burdens of proof. 
These instructions, read as a whole, left no room for confusion regarding the State's 
burden of proof, particularly with regards to Defendant's claim that he was 
elsewhere at the time of the hit-and-run that killed his wife. 
In the instructions that were given, the jury was told that it could not convict 
Defendant unless his "guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt," that there 
was no "real possibility that he's not guilty," that it was "firmly convinced" that 
Defendant had killed his wife —i.e. that he, "Sherman A. Lynch," had "caused the 
death of Patricia Rothermich." R. 177, 179, 182-83, 187. And the jury was also 
instructed that when assessing the evidence, the "prosecution has the burden of 
proof," "the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt," that Defendant was entitled to both a presumption of innocence and "the 
benefit of the doubt," that "defendant isn't required to prove innocence," that the 
jury must "must start by assuming" that Defendant was innocent, and that 
Defendant "never" had the "burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing 
any evidence." R. 177,179,182. 
Thus, while was there was no specific alibi instruction, this jury was still 
unmistakably told that the prosecution had the burden of proof and that Defendant 
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did not. Defendant's newly proposed alibi instruction would therefore have been 
redundant, and Defendant was therefore not prejudiced by its absence. 
II. 
DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT OBTAIN A REVERSAL BASED ON 
A TRANSPARENT TRANSCRIPTION ERROR REGARDING THE 
PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
At trial, Don Carter testified that when he first arrived at the hospital, 
Defendant hugged him and then "started to say, 'What have I,' then immediately 
corrected himself and said, 'What am I going to do?'" R. 284: 67. Although this 
brief exchange did not "mean anything" to Carter "at the time," Defendant's change 
of phrase still "caught [his] ear." R. 284: 67. 
During her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor referred to this exchange and 
argued that it suggested guilt. The transcript currently reads as follows: 
And the other thing he said was to a person he considered his best 
friend that goes to the hospital, that's there with him in his time of 
grief, and he walks up and the first thing he says, "is what have I -
what am I going to do without her? What have I done?" He killed his 
wife. He did it intentionally and then he tried to cover his tracks by 
hiding his truck in the garage. 
R. 285:193 (emphases added). 
Defendant now argues that the prosecutor "engaged in misconduct" by 
incorrectly alleging that he had said "what have I done?" Aplt. Br. 43-50. Defendant 
acknowledges that he did not object below, but nevertheless asks this Court to 
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review the prosecutor's alleged misstatement for plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Aplt. Br. 47-50. 
A. The trial court did not commit plain error. 
Defendant first claims that the trial court plainly erred by failing to correct the 
prosecutor's alleged misstatement. Aplt. Br. 43-50. "[T]o establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant/' State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
1. The trial court did not obviously err when it allowed the 
prosecutor to draw a reasonable inference from Carter's 
testimony. 
During closing arguments, a prosecutor has "the duty and right to argue the 
case based on the total picture shown by the evidence or the lack thereof." State v. 
Ross, 2007 UT 89,155,174 P.3d 628. A prosecutor has "considerable latitude" and is 
entitled to "fully discuss from [her] perspective! ] the evidence and all inferences 
and deductions it supports." Id. at ^ 55; see also State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, 
If 42,163 R3d 695. 
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As noted, Defendant claims that the prosecutor incorrectly quoted him when 
she claimed that he had said "what have I done?" when speaking with Don Carter 
at the hospital. Aplt. Br. 45-46. In the context of his plain error argument, he thus 
argues that the trial court should have sua sponte corrected the prosecutor's alleged 
misstatement. 
But the audio of the actual argument shows why the trial court did not 
interject. Specifically, the audio demonstrates that the prosecutor was not actually 
quoting Defendant at all when she made the statement at issue.3 
The current transcript of this argument reads as follows: 
And the other thing he said was to a person he considered his best 
friend that goes to the hospital, that's there with him in his time of 
grief, and he walks up and the first thing he says, "is what have I -
what am I going to do without her? What have I done?" He killed his 
wife. He did it intentionally and then he tried to cover his tracks by 
hiding his truck in the garage. 
R. 285:193 (emphases added). As noted by Defendant in his brief, the placement of 
the closing quotation marks suggests that the prosecutor was quoting him when she 
said "What have I done?" Aplt.'Br. 43-50. 
3
 On June 2, 2010, this Court supplemented the record to include the 
video/audio of this argument. The CD is externally paginated as R. 292, and the 
internal video contains a timer superimposed on the image. The State will cite to it 
as R. 292 at (time of argument). In addition, the State has attached a copy of that 
recording as Addendum A to this brief. 
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This statement was made from 6:34:08 to 6:34:37 p.m. on the final day of trial. 
See R. 292 at 6:34:08 to 6:34:37. When listened to, the recording shows that the 
prosecutor actually drew a distinction between the sentence: "What have I—what 
am I going to do without her?" and the sentence "What have I done?" This 
occurred on two levels. First, the prosecutor let five full seconds of silence pass 
between the two sentences. R. 292 at 6:34:23 to 6:34:28. And second, the prosecutor 
raised the inflection of her voice on the second sentence in an inquisitive, 
questioning manner. R. 292 at 6:34:28 to 6:34:31. Her raised inflection clearly 
suggested that at that point, she was not quoting Defendant at all, but was instead 
asking the jury to draw the inference —i.e. that when Defendant had said "What 
have I--" and then stopped himself, he had stopped himself from saying "What have 
I done?" 
In the context of a closing argument, the prosecutor's appeal to inference was 
entirely appropriate. See Ross, 2007 UT 89, f^ 55 (stating that a prosecutor has 
"considerable latitude" to "fully discuss from [her] perspective[ ] the evidence and 
all inferences and deductions it supports"). But more importantly, this recording— 
and particularly the on-site reaction to it by those who were in the courtroom— 
demonstrates why Defendant's plain error claim necessarily fails. 
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( 
As noted above, a plain error claim can only succeed if the error should have 
been obvious below. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. And when viewed in this light, it is 
significant that neither the trial court nor defense counsel objected when the 
prosecutor made this statement, thereby suggesting that those present understood 
that the prosecutor was no longer quoting Defendant at that point. As explained by 
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, the "failure of defense counsel to object to 
statements made by a prosecutor during the closing is a matter to which we attach 
significance." Commonwealth v. Leach, 901 N.E.2d 708, 717 (Mass. App. 2009) 
(quotations and citation omitted). "It is not only a sign that what was said sounded 
less exciting at trial than appellate counsel now would have it seem, but it is also 
some indication that the tone and manner of the now challenged aspect of the 
prosecutor's argument were not unfairly prejudicial." Id. 
In other words, if the prosecutor had "obviously" misquoted Defendant at 
that point in her argument, one would have expected some reaction from 
Defendant, his counsel, or the court. But the lack of any such reaction shows that, at 
worst, the statement was ambiguous, thereby defeating a claim of obvious error. 
In the absence of any such reaction or objection, Defendant's claim ultimately 
rests upon the placement of the quotation marks in the current transcript as sole 
support for his claim that the prosecutor was quoting him. Given this, it is 
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significant that Defendant's own brief has already seen fit to correct the placement 
of the quotation marks surrounding the very sentence at issue. As noted above, the 
transcript currently quotes the prosecutor as follows: "And the other thing he said 
was to a person he considered his best friend that goes to the hospital, that's there 
with him in his time of grief, and he walks up and the first thing he says, "is what 
have I - what am I going to do without her? What have I done?" R. 285: 193 
(emphases added). 
By putting the initial quotation mark outside the word "is," the transcript 
thus currently suggests that the quotation began there, rather than with the word 
"what." R. 285: 193. But the prosecutor plainly did not mean that Defendant 
approached Carter and said: "Is what have I — what am I going to do without her?" 
Such a statement would make no linguistic sense. Rather, from context alone, the 
prosecutor clearly meant to say that Defendant began with: "What have I..." Thus, 
the State believes that the transcript should read: ".. .and the first thing he says is, 
'what have I...'". 
With respect to this error, Defendant apparently agrees. He has noted this 
very error in his brief, and, without comment or leave of court, he has already 
corrected it. Aplt. Br. 45. The relevant passage from Defendant's brief accordingly 
quotes the prosecutor as follows: 
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In this case, the prosecutor represented in final rebuttal statements that 
when Lynch encountered his "best friend" at the hospital after 
Roterhmich died, he walked up to his friend "and the first thing he 
says [is 'w]hat have I—what am I going to do without her? What have 
I done?' He killed his wife." 
Aplt. Br. 45 (quoting R. 285:193) (alteration added in Defendant's brief). 
In short, although Defendant openly acknowledges that the opening 
quotation marks are incorrect, he nevertheless charges the prosecutor with official 
misconduct based on the placement of the closing quotation marks in that very same 
passage. But this record does not obviously show that the closing quotation marks 
were correctly placed, that the prosecutor ever claimed that Defendant had said 
"What have I done?" Rather, the recording of the argument, along with the non-
reaction from those in the courtroom, demonstrates that the prosecutor did nothing 
more than ask the jury to draw an inference from Carter's testimony. This was 
permissible in the context of a closing argument, and Defendant has not shown that 
the trial court committed obvious error. 
2. Defendant also has not shown prejudice. 
In addition to showing that the error was obvious, Defendant must also show 
that it was "harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. The question is 
whether, "under the circumstances of the particular case," the jurors were "probably 
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influenced by those remarks." Ross, 2007 UT 89, <[ 54. If "proof of defendant's guilt 
is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Id. 
In this case, there was overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt. 
Prosecutors proved that six weeks before the murder, Defendant purchased a white 
truck (R. 283: 116, 120; 284: 130, 211; 285: 53, 56, 71); Defendant surreptitiously 
stored his truck during the intervening weeks (R. 283:147; 284:155,165-66,213; 285: 
59,62); paint from Defendant's truck ended up on Patricia's clothing during the fatal 
hit-and-run (R. 284:181-202); Defendant's truck was damaged in ways matching the 
collision (R. 283: 125-36; 285: 76-77); Defendant lied to his girlfriend about his 
relationship with his wife (R. 284:120,126-28); Defendant misled police about his 
relationship with his girlfriend (Exh. 94 at 46:18); Defendant lied to police about 
whether he had purchased the truck, as well as the fact that he had stored it in 
Ostler's garage (Exh. 94 at 15:01-16:15,20:50-21:00,31:36-31:48); Defendant tried to 
convince police that he had given the truck to an unidentifiable stranger on the 
freeway, rather than storing it in an abandoned garage near his home (Exh. 94 at 
35:50-37:40); Defendant behaved suspiciously in the hours following the murder, 
alternating between excessive hysteria about Patricia's death when he was speaking 
with police and neighbors (R. 284:39-40,46-47,67-68), and dispassionate lies about 
the incident when speaking to his girlfriend (R. 284: 125); and finally, Defendant 
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openly and repeatedly discussed a financial payout that he expected to come as the 
result of Patricia's death (R. 284: 74, 76,98). 
Given this, Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor's single statement 
at the close of her rebuttal led to his conviction. Rather, the reason for this 
conviction was the jury's assessment of Defendant's guilt after hearing from 22 
witnesses during a three-day trial (with testimony and argument spanning over 500 
pages of transcript), as well as its review of 95 separate exhibits. R. 200-06,283-85. 
That evidence conclusively established Defendant's guilt. Even if Defendant has 
shown that the prosecutor erred with this statement, that error was harmless. 
B. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant alternatively claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the prosecutor's comment. As noted above, Defendant can prevail on this 
claim only if he shows both deficient performance and prejudice. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 
f 6; Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, t 38. Defendant's claim fails under both prongs. 
First, to show deficient performance, a defendant "must overcome the strong 
presumption that his trial counsel rendered adequate assistance, by persuading the 
court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. 
Marble, 2007 UT App 82, f 11,157 P.3d 371 (quotations and citation omitted). It is 
settled in this regard that trial counsel does not perform deficiently by failing to 
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raise a futile objection. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^ 26,1 P.3d 546; State v. 
Whittle, 1999 UT 96, t 34, 989 P.2d 52. "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel 
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality/' Nicholls v. State, 
2009 UT 12, If 36, 203 P.3d 976 (quotations and citation omitted). 
As discussed above, however, there is nothing " demonstrable" about the 
alleged error. Id. Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor claimed that 
Defendant had said "What have I done?" To the contrary, the audio shows that the 
prosecutor only asked the jury to draw an inference that this is what Defendant had 
meant to say. Given this, defense counsel had no reason to object. 
Second, Defendant has also failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the 
result of the trial would have been different without the alleged error. As discussed 
above, the State presented overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt. In these 
circumstances, Defendant has not shown that this isolated comment was an 
improper basis for his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions. 
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